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A RATIONAL BASIS REVIEW THAT 
WARRANTS STRICT SCRUTINY: THE FIRST 
CIRCUIT’S EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS 
IN MASSACHUSETTS v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 
Abstract: On May 31, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
in Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services held Section 
3 of the Defense of Marriage Act unconstitutional. In doing so, the court 
declined to extend heightened scrutiny to sexual preference classifica-
tions and instead relied on a more searching form of rational basis review. 
This Comment argues that the First Circuit’s equal protection analysis is 
flawed because it purports to apply Supreme Court precedent, but fails to 
do so faithfully. It also argues that the court could have reached the same 
result and more effectively insulated its holding from attack by designat-
ing sexual orientation a suspect or quasi-suspect classification. 
Introduction 
 In 1993, in Baehr v. Lewin, the Supreme Court of Hawaii sustained 
the first equal protection challenge to a traditional marriage statute in 
the United States.1 Congress viewed the Baehr ruling as an assault 
against traditional heterosexual marriage laws.2 To combat this per-
ceived threat, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), 
which President Bill Clinton signed into law in 1996.3 DOMA contains 
only two operative paragraphs, and is therefore among the shortest ma-
jor enactments in recent history.4 In pertinent part, Section 3 of DOMA 
provides: 
                                                                                                                      
1 See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993); Courtney Joslin & Shannon 
Minter, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Family Law 514, 517 (2012); Mat-
thew J. Eickman, Same-Sex Marriage: DOMA and the States’ Approaches, BNA Pension & Bene-
fits Daily, May 8, 2009, at 1, 1–2. A “traditional marriage statute” refers to a law that pro-
hibits same-sex marriage. See Rebecca Schatschneider, Comment, On Shifting Sand: The 
Perils of Grounding the Case for Same-Sex Marriage in the Context of Antimiscegenation, 14 Temp. 
Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 285, 286 (2004). 
2 See H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, at 4 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2908. 
3 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 
U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)); see Eickman, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
4 See Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 
2012). 
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In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any 
ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various administra-
tive bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word “mar-
riage” means only a legal union between one man and one 
woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only 
to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.5 
 In 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Massa-
chusetts v. U.S. Department of Health & Human Services held Section 3 un-
constitutional.6 The court relied on a nuanced equal protection review 
that deviated from the traditional tiered analyses applied by other 
courts.7 The First Circuit applied neither a heightened scrutiny stand-
ard, nor the traditional rational basis standard.8 Instead, the court uti-
lized a more searching form of rational basis review—namely, rational 
basis with “bite”—and invalidated Section 3 only after carefully evaluat-
ing Congress’s purported justifications.9 
 Part I of this Comment introduces the fundamentals of equal pro-
tection review, describes how federal courts have treated Section 3, and 
provides the procedural background to Massachusetts.10 Part II exam-
ines the standard of review employed by the First Circuit in Massachu-
setts and explores the court’s decision to utilize this unconventional 
analysis.11 Finally, Part III discusses potential vulnerabilities in the First 
Circuit’s reasoning and posits that the court could have more effective-
                                                                                                                      
5 Defense of Marriage Act § 3, 1 U.S.C. § 7. Commentators have noted that whether an 
individual will receive benefits from over 1000 federal statutory provisions turns on marital 
status. E.g., Virginia F. Coleman, Same-Sex Marriage, in Sophisticated Estate Planning 
Techniques 467, 501 (2009); Eickman, supra note 1, at 2. Accordingly, more than 100,000 
same-sex couples located in states that permit same-sex marriage are affected by DOMA. 
Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 6. 
6 See Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 14–15. 
7 Compare id. at 10–11, 14–15 (applying the more searching form of the rational basis 
standard), with Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 333 (D. Conn. 
2012) (holding that heightened scrutiny is appropriate, but resolving the case under the 
rational basis standard), Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 989 
(N.D. Cal. 2012) (applying a heightened scrutiny standard), Dragovich v. U.S. Dep’t of the 
Treasury, 764 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1189 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (applying the rational basis stand-
ard), Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (applying the rational 
basis standard), In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567, 575 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011) (applying a height-
ened scrutiny standard), and In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 144 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) 
(applying the rational basis standard). 
8 See Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 10–11, 14–15. 
9 See id. 
10 See infra notes 13–45 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra notes 46–62 and accompanying text. 
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ly protected the rights of homosexuals by holding that sexual orienta-
tion is a suspect or quasi-suspect classification.12 
I. Prior Treatment of DOMA in Federal Courts 
A. The Competing Equal Protection Standards Applied to DOMA 
 The constitutional status of DOMA, and the equal protection 
standard with which to weigh its merits, has sparked stark disagreement 
among the federal courts.13 At issue is whether sexual orientation quali-
fies as a suspect or quasi-suspect classification for the purposes of equal 
protection review.14 Such designations are reserved for specific histori-
cally disadvantaged groups and will trigger a heightened standard of 
review.15 
                                                                                                                      
12 See infra notes 63–95 and accompanying text. 
13 See supra note 7 (collecting cases). The modern, tiered approach to equal protection 
analysis originates from a famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products Co., where 
the Supreme Court observed that certain constitutional claims require more exacting judi-
cial scrutiny, particularly those that stem from discrimination against a “discrete and insu-
lar minority.” 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional 
Law: Principles and Policies 552 (4th ed. 2011); J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 275, 283–84 (1989) (observing that Footnote Four recognized the Court’s role in 
protecting the rights of groups that are shut out of the political process). This analysis has 
evolved into a three-tiered framework for equal protection review. See City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439--41(1985); Chemerinsky, supra, at 552–54, 687–88; 
Mark Strasser, Equal Protection, Same-Sex Marriage, and Classifying on the Basis of Sex, 38 Pepp. 
L. Rev. 1021, 1023 (2011). “Suspect classes” —such as race and national origin—are sub-
ject to a heightened review known as “strict scrutiny,” under which statutes are rarely up-
held. See Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 8–9; Chemerinsky, supra, at 554; Strasser, supra, at 
1023–25. Classifications that are “quasi-suspect” —such as gender and illegitimacy—are 
subject to “intermediate scrutiny,” which is also considered a heightened form of review. 
See Chemerinsky, supra, at 553, 797; Strasser, supra, at 1023–25. The remaining class is a 
catch-all category for anything that does not fall into either of the first two and is subject to 
the “rational basis” standard—a highly deferential form of review. See Massachusetts, 682 
F.3d at 9; Chemerinsky, supra, at 688; Strasser, supra, at 1023. Although somewhat less 
stringent than strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny is still far more demanding than ra-
tional basis review. See Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 9; Chemerinsky, supra, at 553–54, 686–87; 
Strasser, supra, at 1023–25. 
14 Compare Wilson, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 1308–09 (finding that sexual orientation does not 
warrant heightened scrutiny), and In re Kandu, 315 B.R. at 144–46 (same), with Pedersen, 
881 F. Supp. 2d at 333 (finding that sexual orientation warrants heightened scrutiny), 
Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 989 (same), and In re Balas, 449 B.R. at 575 (same). 
15 See Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 797 (describing the types of classes subject to in-
termediate or strict scrutiny review); Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Disparate 
Treatment of Race and Class in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 72 Law & Contemp. Probs. 109, 
118, 120 (2009) (indicating that suspect designations protect the chronically disadvan-
taged). 
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 The U.S. Supreme Court has established a variety of indicia to de-
termine whether a classification is suspect or quasi-suspect.16 Generally, 
(1) the classification associated with the group must be an immutable 
characteristic,17 (2) the group must have suffered a history of invidious 
discrimination,18 (3) the group must be politically powerless,19 and (4) 
the distinguishing characteristics that define the group must bear no 
relation to its members’ ability to perform or contribute to society.20 
Importantly, no single factor is dispositive in determining whether a 
certain class triggers heightened scrutiny.21 Instead, the courts weigh 
each factor in making their determinations.22 In practice, however, 
                                                                                                                      
16 See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531–32 (1996); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 
U.S. 635, 638 (1986); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442–47; Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 
686 (1973) (plurality opinion); see also Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 
426 (Conn. 2008) (succinctly synthesizing the general indicia required by the U.S. Su-
preme Court). The Supreme Court has established this set of criteria to constrain the 
number of classes that trigger heightened scrutiny review. See Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating 
Suspect Classifications, 35 Seattle U. L. Rev. 135, 171–72 (2011); Kenji Yoshino, Assimila-
tionist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” 
108 Yale L.J. 485, 562 (1998). Nevertheless, commentators argue that the Supreme 
Court’s 2003 decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), indicates that the Court 
may be amenable to applying heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation classifications. See 
Courtney A. Powers, Finding LGBTs A Suspect Class: Assessing the Political Power of LGBTs as a 
Basis for the Court’s Application of Heightened Scrutiny, 17 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 385, 
387–88 (2010); Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme 
Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual 
Orientation, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 2769, 2770 (2005). In Lawrence, the Supreme Court inval-
idated a Texas statute that criminalized homosexual sodomy because it violated homosex-
uals’ right to liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See 539 
U.S. at 578–79. Importantly, by overruling the 1986 Supreme Court case Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 487 U.S. 186 (1986), this ruling effectively undermined the foundation that many 
courts relied on to deny sexual orientation suspect or quasi-suspect status. See Powers, su-
pra, at 387–88. 
17 See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686 (plurality opinion); see also Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 426; 
Powers, supra note 16, at 387–88; Smith, supra note 16, at 2770. 
18 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985); see also Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 426; Powers, supra 
note 16, at 387–88; Smith, supra note 16, at 2770. 
19 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); see also Kerri-
gan, 957 A.2d at 426; Powers, supra note 16, at 387–88; Smith, supra note 16, at 2770. 
20 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441–44; Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976); see also 
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 426; Powers, supra note 16, at 387–88; Smith, supra note 16, at 2770. 
21 Kyle C. Velte, Paths to Protection: A Comparison of Federal Protection Based on Disability 
and Sexual Orientation, 6 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 323, 372 (2000); see Golinski, 824 F. 
Supp. 2d at 983. 
22 Velte, supra note 21, at 372; see Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 983. One court has noted, 
“[t]he presence of any of the factors is a signal that the particular classification is ‘more 
likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pur-
suit of some legitimate objective,’ thus requiring heightened scrutiny.” Golinski, 824 F. 
Supp. 2d at 983 (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982)). 
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courts tend to place particular emphasis on whether the characteristic 
bears on a person’s ability to contribute to society and the presence of a 
history of discrimination, while relying on political powerlessness and 
the immutability of the characteristic as supporting factors.23 
 Initially, courts tended to deny sexual orientation suspect or quasi-
suspect status and to uphold the constitutionality of Section 3.24 In 2005, 
in Wilson v. Ake, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida 
held that Section 3 of DOMA did not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause; that the applicable standard of review was “rational basis,” rather 
than heightened scrutiny; and that the government’s purported inter-
ests easily satisfied such a deferential standard.25 Similarly, in 2004, the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Washington in In re 
Kandu upheld the constitutionality of DOMA applying the same logic.26 
 More recent cases, however, have cast doubt on DOMA.27 In 2011, 
in Dragovich v. U.S. Department of the Treasury, the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of California applied rational basis review and 
                                                                                                                      
23 Smith, supra note 16, at 2775; see Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 426. For example, the Su-
preme Court has held that resident aliens are deserving of heightened scrutiny review—
despite the mutability of alienage. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n.11 (1977); see also 
Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 427 n.20 (observing that the Supreme Court has often left any refer-
ence to “immutability” out of its analysis entirely). In addition, the Supreme Court has 
held that racial classifications merit heightened scrutiny irrespective of political power. See 
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433–34 (1984); see also Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 428 n.21 (indi-
cating that in all cases where a class suffered from a history of discrimination, and was 
characterized by a distinguishing feature unrelated to their ability to perform in society, 
the Supreme Court did not give any weight to political power—or powerlessness). 
24 See Andrew Koppelman, DOMA, Romer, and Rationality, 58 Drake L. Rev. 923, 927 
n.21 (2010). 
25 See 354 F. Supp. 2d at 1308–09. Under the traditional rational basis review, classifica-
tions will survive as long as they bear a rational relationship to some legitimate governmen-
tal purpose. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993); see Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 
696. In the case of a suspect class—and strict scrutiny review—for a classification to survive, 
it is not enough that a justification be rational or even important. See Chemerinsky, supra 
note 13, at 711. Instead, the discrimination at issue must be necessary to promote a compel-
ling state interest. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 554; see Anna C. Tavis, Note, Healthcare 
for All: Ensuring States Comply with the Equal Protection Rights of Legal Immigrants, 51 B.C. L. 
Rev. 1627, 1657 (2010). To qualify as “necessary,” the government must show that the law 
in question is the least restrictive or discriminatory method available for achieving the 
compelling interest. Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 554. This has led some to refer to the 
standard as “strict in theory and fatal in fact.” Id. In the case of a quasi-suspect class—and 
intermediate scrutiny review—a distinction must be supported by an exceedingly persua-
sive justification. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532–33 (articulating the standard for gender-
based classifications); Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 553. 
26 See 315 B.R. at 144–46 (finding that DOMA should be analyzed under rational basis 
review and that DOMA satisfied this standard). 
27 See, e.g., Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1002 (holding Section 3 unconstitutional); 
Dragovich, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 1190 (same); In re Balas, 449 B.R. at 579 (same). 
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held that Section 3 deprived same-sex couples of equal protection un-
der the law.28 Unlike previous courts that had accepted such justifica-
tions, the court in Dragovich rejected that DOMA was rationally related 
to the goals of promoting procreation, encouraging heterosexual mar-
riage, preserving governmental resources, and expressing moral disap-
proval.29 Some courts have gone further and held that DOMA triggers 
heightened scrutiny.30 In 2012, in Golinski v. U.S. Office of Personnel Man-
agement, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California 
invalidated Section 3 of DOMA after applying such a standard.31 
 Finally, in 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
in Windsor v. United States was the first federal appeals court to strike 
down Section 3 while applying heightened scrutiny review.32 The plain-
tiff, Edith Windsor, was the surviving spouse of a same-sex marriage 
who sought the benefit of the unlimited spousal deduction for federal 
estate taxes denied her by Section 3.33 The Second Circuit held that the 
denial of Windsor’s spousal benefits violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.34 In reaching its decision, the court applied intermediate scru-
tiny and devoted significant space to explaining why homosexuals con-
stitute a quasi-suspect class.35 
B. Factual and Procedural History 
 In 2009, two cases challenging the constitutionality of DOMA were 
filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts: Gill v. 
Office of Personnel Management and Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of 
                                                                                                                      
28 764 F. Supp. 2d at 1189–90. 
29 Compare id. at 1190 (finding that DOMA was not rationally related to these justifica-
tions), with Wilson, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 1308–09 (finding that DOMA was rationally related 
to the governmental interest of encouraging relationships that are optimal for procreation 
and for raising of children by their biological parents), and In re Kandu, 315 B.R. at 145–46 
(same). 
30 See Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 333; Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 989; In re Balas, 449 
B.R. at 575. 
31 See 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1002. Additionally, both the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the 
Central District of California in 2011 in In re Balas and the U.S. District Court of Connecti-
cut in 2012 in Pedersen v. Office of Personnel Management held that DOMA triggered height-
ened scrutiny. See Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 333; In re Balas, 449 B.R. at 575. These courts, 
however, went on to opine that DOMA does not even survive rational basis review. Pedersen, 
881 F. Supp. 2d at 333; In re Balas, 449 B.R. at 579. 
32 See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 188 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 
786 (Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-307). 
33 Windsor, 699 F.3d at 175. This benefit was worth $363,053. Id. at 176; see 26 U.S.C. 
§ 2056(a) (2006). 
34 Windsor, 699 F.3d at 188. 
35 See id. at 181–85, 188. 
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Health & Human Services.36 In both cases, the judges held that Section 3 
of DOMA was unconstitutional.37 Despite this holding, the court in Gill 
did not address the plaintiffs’ arguments that DOMA should be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny.38 Instead, the court found that DOMA failed to 
pass constitutional muster even under the highly deferential rational 
basis standard.39 
 On appeal, the two district court cases were consolidated.40 Despite 
defending the constitutionality of DOMA at the district court level, the 
U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced in February 2011 that 
it would abandon its defense of DOMA.41 Instead, the DOJ filed a re-
vised brief in which it conceded that although DOMA could survive 
rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause, it nevertheless 
warranted heightened scrutiny, which it failed.42 The DOJ stressed that 
the Supreme Court had yet to rule on the proper equal protection 
standard with which to adjudicate classifications based on sexual orien-
tation.43 Nevertheless, the DOJ illustrated that the Supreme Court had 
instead provided a clear set of guidelines by which to identify classes 
that are deserving of heightened scrutiny—the indicia of suspectness— 
which homosexuals readily satisfy.44 Furthermore, the DOJ underscored 
that courts holding otherwise failed adequately to consider the matter, 
                                                                                                                      
36 See Complaint at 5, Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 2010) 
(No. 3:10-cv-01750-VLB); Complaint at 1, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010) (No. 1:09-cv-11156-JLT). 
37 See Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 387; Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 249, 253. Gill v. Office 
of Personnel Management was an equal protection challenge brought by seven same-sex cou-
ples who were legally married in Massachusetts and three surviving spouses of same-sex 
relationships. See Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 6. Its companion case, Massachusetts v. U.S. De-
partment of Health & Human Services, was brought by the Commonwealth. Id. at 7. In con-
trast to Gill, the Commonwealth’s case was premised on federalism concerns. See Massachu-
setts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 235–36. Specifically, the Commonwealth argued that Section 3 of 
DOMA violated the Tenth Amendment by infringing on a traditional area of state sover-
eignty, and violated the Spending Clause by requiring the Commonwealth to discriminate 
against its citizens to receive federal funding. Id. at 235–36, 249. 
38 See 699 F. Supp. 2d at 387. 
39 Id. 
40 Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 1. 
41 Statement of Eric Holder, Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the At-
torney General on Litigation Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-222.html. 
42 Superseding Brief for the U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. at 45--46 & n.20, 
Massachusetts, 682 F.3d 1 (Nos. 10-2204, 10-2207, 10-2214). 
43 Id. at 26 & n.9. 
44 Id. at 28. 
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relied on outdated Supreme Court jurisprudence, or simply applied 
flawed logic.45 
II. The First Circuit’s Equal Protection Review 
 In 2012, the First Circuit in Massachusetts held Section 3 of DOMA 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.46 In reaching its 
decision, the First Circuit relied on a more searching form of rational 
basis review, an equal protection standard never before applied to 
DOMA.47 The court’s analysis was informed by a series of Supreme 
Court cases that have applied this rarely administered, more searching 
review.48 Under this analysis, purported justifications for the disparate 
treatment of politically unpopular minorities are more carefully evalu-
ated.49 Invoking this more cautious analysis, the First Circuit concluded 
that none of DOMA’s purported justifications adequately supported 
Section 3.50 
 The standard used by the First Circuit in Massachusetts is distinct 
from the traditional rational basis and heightened scrutiny standards.51 
The purpose of this more searching rational basis review is to invalidate 
                                                                                                                      
45 Id. at 27–28 & n.11. 
46 Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2012). 
47 See id. at 10–11, 14–15. 
48 See Koppelman, supra note 24, at 928–29 & n.29; Strasser, supra note 13, at 1029–30. 
49 See Koppelman, supra note 24, at 928–29 & n.29; Strasser, supra note 13, at 1029–30. 
The First Circuit relied on three Supreme Court cases to support this proposition. See Mas-
sachusetts, 682 F.3d at 10–11. In 1973, in U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, the Court 
held that distinguishing between households of related persons and those of unrelated 
persons for the purposes of a food stamp program was not rationally related to the pur-
ported purpose of stimulating the agricultural economy. See 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). The 
First Circuit observed that central to the holding in Moreno was a “bare congressional de-
sire to harm a politically unpopular group.” Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 10; see Moreno, 413 
U.S. at 534. In 1985, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, the Court rejected the prof-
fered justifications for denying a special permit to a group home for mentally disabled 
persons because discriminating against the mentally disabled was not rationally related to 
an ordinance aimed at avoiding excessive population density. See 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985). 
The First Circuit noted that the discrimination in Cleburne was driven by unsubstantiated 
negative attitudes and irrational discrimination. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 10; see Cleburne, 
473 U.S. at 450. Finally, in Romer v. Evans, in 1996, the Court held that a state’s constitu-
tional prohibition of any state action designed to protect homosexuals from discrimination 
was so broad and unprecedented that it could not be rationally related to the purported 
goal of respecting citizens’ freedom of association. See 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996). Again, the 
First Circuit observed that the constitutional provision in Romer was a mere “status-based 
enactment.” Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 10; see Romer, 517 U.S. at 634–35. 
50 See Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 15. 
51 See id. at 10. 
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legislation characterized by pretextual or impermissible justifications.52 
Nevertheless, although it is less deferential than traditional rational ba-
sis review, the more searching form utilized by the First Circuit does not 
require the government to provide a more substantial or compelling 
justification.53 Thus, the only difference between the more searching 
rational basis review and traditional rational basis review is that the 
former involves a more thorough evaluation of the purported justifica-
tions themselves.54 Under both standards, as long as there is any ration-
al basis for the law, it is upheld.55 In contrast, courts employ a much 
more stringent standard under a heightened scrutiny.56 
 In relying on this alternative standard, the First Circuit declined to 
apply a more rigorous standard of review.57 According to the court, 
evaluating DOMA under a heightened scrutiny standard was not a via-
ble option.58 First, the court stated that in the absence of supervening 
authority, new panels are bound by the decisions of old panels.59 As a 
result, the court concluded that it was bound by a 2008 case, Cook v. 
Gates, in which a First Circuit panel declined to recognize sexual pref-
erence as a suspect classification.60 Second, the First Circuit expressed 
that treating sexual orientation as a suspect class would inappropriately 
imply an overruling of the Supreme Court’s 1972 summary dismissal of 
Baker v. Nelson, a case in which the Court was asked to rule on the claim 
that a state’s refusal to recognize same-sex marriage violated federal 
equal protection principles.61 The First Circuit reasoned that it lacked 
power to take such action and expressed doubt that the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                      
52 See id. 
53 See 3 William W. Bassett et al., Religious Organizations and the Law 14-31, 
14-33 (2012). 
54 See Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 9 (describing that the more searching review yields a 
more careful examination of purported justifications); Bassett, supra note 53, at 14-33 
(indicating that the more searching review nevertheless has the same requirements as 
rational basis review). It is specifically when justifications have served as a pretext for ani-
mus that the Supreme Court has utilized the rational basis with bite standard to invalidate 
legislation. See Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 887, 
901–16 (2012) (illustrating that the laws in Moreno, Cleburne, and Romer were invalidated 
because of perceived animus). 
55 See Bassett, supra note 53, at 14-33; Koppelman, supra note 24, at 939. 
56 See Strasser, supra note 13, at 1023. 
57 Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 9. 
58 See id. 
59 United States v. Holloway, 499 F.3d 114, 118 (1st Cir. 2007). 
60 Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 9; see Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 61–62 (1st Cir. 2008). 
61 Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 8–9; see Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). The Su-
preme Court summarily dismissed the claim for want of a substantial federal question. 
Baker, 409 U.S. 810. 
52 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 54: E. Supp. 
would overrule Baker, given the missed opportunity to do so in 1996 in 
Romer v. Evans.62 
III. The Path Not Taken: Applying Heightened Scrutiny Review 
to Sexual Orientation Classifications 
 The First Circuit reached the correct result by holding Section 3 of 
DOMA unconstitutional, but relied on flawed reasoning.63 This Part be-
gins by arguing that sexual orientation is a suspect or quasi-suspect clas-
sification.64 This Part then argues that the First Circuit was not barred 
from making this judgment, despite its assertions to the contrary.65 Fi-
nally, this Part explains how the First Circuit’s reasoning makes the deci-
sion vulnerable to attack.66 
 The First Circuit should have held that sexual orientation is a sus-
pect or quasi-suspect class.67 Homosexuals, as a group, satisfy the variety 
of indicia identified by the Supreme Court as indicative of whether a 
class warrants heightened scrutiny.68 First, it is overwhelmingly accepted 
within the scientific community that sexual orientation is not a charac-
teristic consciously subject to change.69 Second, homosexuals have 
                                                                                                                      
62 Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 9; see supra note 49 (discussing Romer). The Court in Romer 
held that the Colorado constitutional amendment at issue did not survive even rational 
basis review, but declined to address whether sexual orientation classifications trigger 
heightened scrutiny review. Strasser, supra note 13, at 1028–29. 
63 See infra notes 64–95 and accompanying text. 
64 See infra notes 67–75 and accompanying text. 
65 See infra notes 76–85 and accompanying text. 
66 See infra notes 86–95 and accompanying text. 
67 See Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 824 F. Supp. 2d 968, 985, 989 (N.D. Cal. 
2012) (holding that homosexuals as a group satisfy the requisite suspect class indicia), reh’g 
en banc denied, 680 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2012); Chemerinsky, supra note 13, at 807 (observ-
ing that sexual orientation classifications bear many similar characteristics to classifications 
that traditionally receive heightened scrutiny). The courts have not provided meaningful 
guidance for distinguishing between the propriety of a “suspect” or “quasi-suspect” label. 
Powers, supra note 16, at 387 n.16; see Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 
430 (Conn. 2008). See generally Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d 968 (failing to articulate distin-
guishing features between the labels). In fact, courts apply precisely the same totality test 
to establish either designation. Powers, supra note 16, at 387 n.16; see Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 
430; Velte, supra note 21, at 372. Accordingly, this Comment does not distinguish between 
the designations of “suspect” or “quasi-suspect” classes. 
68 See Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 985, 989; see also supra notes 16–23 and accompanying 
text (providing an overview of the indicia for suspect or quasi-suspect classifications). 
69 See Just the Facts Coal., Just the Facts about Sexual Orientation and 
Youth: A Primer for Principals, Educators, and School Personnel 6 (2008), http:// 
www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/just-the-facts.pdf (“The American Academy of Pediatrics, 
the American Counseling Association, the American Psychiatric Association, the American 
Psychological Association, the American School Counselor Association, the National Asso-
ciation of School Psychologists, and the National Association of Social Workers, together 
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been—and continue to be—subjected to deliberate and malicious dis-
crimination based solely on their sexual orientation.70 Third, the linger-
ing result of this pervasive historical bigotry is that homosexuals lack the 
political power to rectify discrimination by resorting to the democratic 
process.71 Although some political gains have been achieved by the ho-
mosexual community, they are few and far between.72 Thirty-seven states 
have banned same-sex marriage through the legislative process, includ-
ing constitutional amendments, whereas only a relatively small number 
have been successful in passing legislation that legalizes it.73 Fourth, 
courts have acknowledged that, unlike age or mental disability—both of 
which have been denied suspect status—homosexuality is utterly unre-
lated to a person’s ability to contribute to society.74 In contrast, the de-
fining characteristics of age and mental disability—diminished physical 
and mental capacity—are directly related to a person’s ability to cope 
and function in society.75 
                                                                                                                      
representing more than 480,000 mental health professionals, have all taken the position 
that homosexuality is not a mental disorder and thus is not something that needs to or can 
be ‘cured.’”). But see High Tech Gays v. Def. Indus. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 
(9th Cir. 1990) (arguing that homosexuality is a mutable behavior). 
70 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 434. The American Psychiatric Association (“APA”) has argued 
that homosexuals are among the most stigmatized of all minority groups. Id. at 432. Ac-
cording to the APA, homosexual-related hate crimes, heckling, and humiliation remain 
rampant throughout the nation. See id. at 432–33. This stigmatism is felt in both school and 
professional settings, where many gay and lesbian persons fear the repercussions of identi-
fying as a homosexual. See id. at 433. 
71 See id. at 444. The test for political powerlessness does not require a literal lack of polit-
ical power. Id. (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)). For exam-
ple, both women and African-Americans continue to be regarded as quasi-suspect and sus-
pect, respectively, despite the fact that they wield significant political power. See id.; Smith, 
supra note 16, at 2776–77. Instead, the test is satisfied if there is a risk that the group cannot 
readily mollify discrimination through the democratic process due to a marked, widespread, 
and persistent discrimination previously suffered by the group of people. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d 
at 444 (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440). 
72 See Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 988 (“While President Obama nominated four open-
ly-gay judges, there are literally hundreds of federal judges nationwide.”); Kerrigan, 957 
A.2d at 447 (“No openly gay person ever has been appointed to a United States Cabinet 
position or to any federal appeals court.”); Andersen v. King Cnty., 138 P.3d 963, 1032 
(Wash. 2006) (Bridge, J., concurring in dissent) (“Nationwide, 511,000 people hold office 
at the local, state, and national level. Of those, a mere 305 are openly gay.”). 
73 Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Defining Marriage: Defense of Marriage Acts and 
Same-Sex Marriage Laws, NCSL, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/same-
sex-marriage-overview.aspx (last updated Nov. 2012) (providing an overview of state same-
sex marriage laws); see Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 988. 
74 See, e.g., Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 318–19 (D. Conn. 
2012); Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 986; In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567, 577 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
2011); Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 435. 
75 See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441–42; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 435. 
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 Additionally, despite its assertions to the contrary, the First Circuit 
was not barred from designating sexual orientation a suspect or quasi-
suspect class.76 The First Circuit has held that in order for a prior Cir-
cuit decision to constitute binding precedent on a particular issue, the 
specific issue must have been argued, heard, and decided.77 Significant-
ly, in 2008 in Cook v. Gates, the First Circuit was not presented with any 
evidence or argument on the record regarding the potential for sexual 
orientation to fall within a suspect category.78 Consequently, the court’s 
opinion did not analyze the relevant factors for such a consideration.79 
Instead, the court merely accepted, at face value, that the Supreme 
Court did not itself mandate that homosexuals constitute a suspect 
class.80 
 Similarly, the Supreme Court’s summary dismissal of Baker v. Nelson 
in 1972 did not bar the First Circuit from finding sexual orientation to 
be a suspect or quasi-suspect class.81 The Supreme Court has held that 
summary dispositions are limited in precedential value and should be 
narrowly interpreted.82 A summary disposition has value with regard 
solely to the issues that were necessarily decided by the action.83 Fur-
thermore, a summary disposition is not dispositive for any other issue, 
however related.84 Given the limited value of summary dispositions and 
the fact that Baker solely considered the constitutionality of state legisla-
tion, Baker is not dispositive of an equal protection challenge to federal 
legislation.85 
 Finally, the First Circuit’s reliance on the more searching rational 
basis standard exposed the decision to two main vulnerabilities.86 A 
comparison of Massachusetts with the flagship cases applying the more 
                                                                                                                      
76 See In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 137–38 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (holding that Baker 
v. Nelson was not binding on an evaluation of DOMA under the Equal Protection Clause); 
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee Commonwealth of Massachusetts at 53–54, Massachusetts v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (No. 10-2204) (arguing 
that the First Circuit was not prohibited from holding sexual orientation to be a suspect or 
quasi-suspect class by its 2008 decision in Cook v. Gates). 
77 Gately v. Massachusetts, 2 F.3d 1221, 1226 (1st Cir. 1993). 
78 See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 76, at 54. 
79 See Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 61–62 (1st Cir. 2008) (failing to analyze these factors). 
80 See id. 
81 See In re Kandu, 315 B.R. at 136–38. 
82 See id. at 138; see also Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 
173, 182–83 (1979) (“A summary disposition affirms only the judgment of the court below 
. . . and no more may be read into our action than was essential to sustain that judgment.”). 
83 See In re Kandu, 315 B.R. at 136 (citing Illinois State Bd. of Elections, 440 U.S. at 182). 
84 See id. 
85 See id. at 137–38; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 76, at 33–34. 
86 See infra notes 87–95 and accompanying text. 
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searching rational basis standard illustrates the weaknesses inherent in 
the First Circuit’s use of this standard.87 First, in the Supreme Court cas-
es U.S. Department of Agriculture v. Moreno in 1973, City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Center in 1985, and Romer v. Evans in 1996, the more 
searching rational basis review revealed classifications solely driven by 
animosity toward a politically unpopular group.88 In contrast, although 
the First Circuit purportedly held DOMA unconstitutional under the 
very same analysis, the court deliberately declined to find a similar ani-
mus behind this legislation.89 Second, it was critical to the Supreme 
Court’s holdings in these cases that the purported justifications for the 
challenged laws were not rationally related to their purposes.90 In con-
trast, DOMA differs in that one could feasibly establish such a rationally 
related justification.91 For example, in her concurrence to Lawrence v. 
Texas in 2003, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor articulated that protecting 
the long-standing tradition of marriage is a legitimate goal, distinct from 
a mere animus toward homosexuals.92 Justice O’Connor argued that a 
classification based on sexual orientation could survive rational basis 
review, and its more searching counterpart, if supported by such a justi-
fication.93 Therefore, the First Circuit’s failure to recognize the animus 
                                                                                                                      
87 Compare Romer, 517 U.S. at 634 (identifying a patent animus behind the purported 
justifications), Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 450 (same), and U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 
U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (same), with Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 16 (declining to find a similar 
animus). Indeed, as one scholar has noted, unlike the state constitutional amendment in 
Romer, DOMA may have a rationally related state interest. See Koppelman, supra note 24, at 
939. 
88 See Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 10 (reviewing Supreme Court precedent); Koppelman, 
supra note 24, at 928–29. 
89 Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 16. The First Circuit indicated that the many legislators 
supporting DOMA had a variety of motivations. Id. The court reasoned that although a 
number of comments made by individuals revealed an animus toward homosexuals, the 
motives of this minority could not be imputed to the vast majority who voted for the stat-
ute. Id. 
90 See id. at 10 (illustrating the refuted justifications in these cases). 
91 See Bassett et al., supra note 53, at 14-34; Koppelman, supra note 24, at 939. 
92 See 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
93 See id. In contrast, the interest of protecting marital traditions would fail under both in-
termediate scrutiny and the more stringent strict scrutiny review. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 
P.3d 384, 451 (Cal. 2008), superseded by constitutional amendment, Cal. Const. art. I, § 7.5; Ker-
rigan, 957 A.2d at 478; Goodwin v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 972–73 & n.5 (Mass. 
2003) (Greaney, J., concurring). Intermediate review requires that a justification be “exceed-
ingly persuasive.” See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 545–46 (1996); Kerrigan, 957 
A.2d at 478. It is not enough that classification simply advance a legitimate state interest; 
instead, the interest must also be distinct from the classification itself. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 
545–46; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 478 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 635). The interest of protecting 
marital traditions fails this test because the tradition of excluding same-sex persons from 
marriage is essentially the same as the classification engendered by DOMA. See Virginia, 518 
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underlying DOMA and its reliance on the premise that DOMA has no 
rationally related justifications are two critical flaws in its application of 
the more searching rational basis review.94 By extending a heightened 
scrutiny standard to sexual orientation classifications, the First Circuit 
could have better insulated its ruling from attack, and thus more effec-
tively protected the rights of homosexuals.95 
Conclusion 
 The First Circuit in Massachusetts relied on a more searching form 
of rational basis review to hold Section 3 of DOMA unconstitutional. 
Although the First Circuit reached the correct result, a comparison 
with Supreme Court jurisprudence illustrates that the First Circuit’s 
equal protection analysis featured a number of flaws that make it vul-
nerable to attack. Thus, the First Circuit should have held that sexual 
orientation is a suspect or quasi-suspect class. Had the First Circuit 
done so, it could have reached the same result and more effectively in-
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U.S. at 545–46; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 478 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 635); Goodwin, 798 N.E.2d 
at 972–73 & n.5 (Greaney, J., concurring). In other words, this justification would be inade-
quate because it simply repeats—and does not explain—the classification. See Virginia, 518 
U.S. at 545–46; Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 478 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 635); Goodwin, 798 N.E.2d 
at 972–73 & n.5 (Greaney, J., concurring). 
94 See supra note 86–93 and accompanying text. 
95 See Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 188 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that DOMA 
does not survive heightened scrutiny review), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (Dec. 7, 2012) 
(No. 12-307); Golinski, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 995 (same); In re Balas, 449 B.R. at 579 (same). 
